Abstract: A senior Russian economist examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2011. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officiallyreported.Lastly,oneoftheauthor'sinterestingconclusionsisthatChinaprovides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
INTRODUCTION S
tate-controlled banks are now reclaiming their role as the backbone of the Russian bankingsystemaswellasthemainexternalsourceoffinancingfortheeconomyasawhole. Sincethe1998financialcrisis,far-reachingchangeshaveoccurredintheinstitutionalstructure of the banking industry. The calculations presented in this paper suggest that banks that are either directly or indirectly controlled by the state now dominate practically all segments of the banking market, whereas genuine commercial banking based on private initiative is in decline. These changes affect market concentration and competitiveness as well as bank efficiency.
Government banking has attracted considerable academic attention. For example, an influentialpaperonthepoliticaleconomyofstatebankingbyLaPortaetal. (2002)reviewed the causes and consequences of direct state ownership of banks, with a focus on developing countries.Thecomparativeefficiencyandcompetitivenessofstate-controlledbanksversus domesticprivateandforeign-ownedentitieshasbeenthesubjectofanumberofempirical studies (Bonin et al., 2005; Fries et al., 2006; Fungáčová et al., 2010; Karas et al., 2010; Anzoátegui et al., 2012) . Efforts have been made to re-test the macroeconomic effects of government ownership of banks, using recent empirical data. Some scholars (e.g., Andrianova et al.,2011; KörnerandSchnabel,2011 )havechallengedthenotionthattheimpactofgovernmentbankingisuniformlynegative(LaPortaetal.,2002 onthefinancialdevelopmentand economic growth of developing countries. They posit that in reality the impact can be either negative or positive, depending on the initial level of economic development, the nature of local institutions, and other parameters as well.
In addition to the ongoing debate about the impact of state banking on economic growth and development, another source of support for the research in this paper came from the transition economics literature, especially that dealing with convergence of European emerging markets with "old" Europe. It becomes increasingly difficult to assume that Russia is followingasimilartrajectoryofconvergencewithEurope.Onecanfindgrowingsimilarities between the models of banking in Russia and in China, although Speranskaya (2009) has argued that divergence is actually more prominent than convergence. In the recent past, this author has more than once questioned the direction of structural change in the banking industry (e.g., see Vernikov, 2009 Vernikov, , 2011 of Russia.
This paper continues to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia, by presenting an alternative estimate of the public sector's share in the country's banking industry, as well as discussing some distinctively Russian characteristics, such as the paradoxically highprofitabilityofstate-controlledbanks(whichcontradictspredictionsbasedontheory) and the replacement of direct government ownership by less transparent forms of indirect ownership and control. I also suggest a different way of measuring market concentration in Russia by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks, which substantially increases the indices of concentration. Finally, it is argued here that Russian banking should be compared with that of China rather than with the banks of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that had formerly been under state control under socialism.
The section of the paper that follows focuses on developments within the public sector of Russia's banking system, such as replacement of direct government ownership and control by indirectcontrolandtherelativeprofitabilityofdifferenttypesofbanks.Athirdsectionexamines changes in the structure of Russian banking and places them in an international context. Thisisfollowedbyafourthsectionthatdiscussespolicyimplicationsandafinalone,which presents my conclusions.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Scope of the Public Sector
This study distinguishes two types of state-controlled banks, namely those directly and indirectly controlled.
2 In the former, the controlling proportion of shares is owned by federalor subfederal-level governments. In the latter, the controlling stake (at least half of equity) is held by companies or banks whose equity is formed with public funds. I have reviewed the annual and quarterly reports of banks and their parent companies (whose issuance is required by law) to determine the presence of public-sector institutions among bank shareholders (and amongshareholdersofshareholders).Becauseofficialsourcesdonotbreakdowncompanies by the form of property in a substantive manner (Sprenger, 2010, p. 68) , the banks were segregatedbytheauthorintotwocategoriesonthebasisofofficialdesignationsdetailedin Table1,whichincorporatesallbanksthatcouldbeidentifiedaseitherdirectlyorindirectly state controlled.
After peaking at a level of 47 banks in December 2009, the number of state-controlled banks in our sample had shrunk to 38 institutions by the beginning of 2012, of which 16 were directly controlled by the authorities and 22 were governed by the state indirectly. The latter category includes the offspring of public sector banks (VTBs), "state corporations," 3 industrial companies (Gazprom, Rosneft', RZhD-Russian Railways, and Alrosa), and indirectly state-controlledbanks (Gazprombank,TransKreditBank,VBRR,andBankMoskvy) .
Expansion of the market share of state-controlled banks in Russia began from a low level of 36 percent in 1999, and was driven by a combination of organic growth and takeovers of privatebanks.Mycalculationsindicatethatfromthefirstquarterof2000throughthefirst quarter of 2011, the assets of state-controlled banks grew by 62 percent, 4 whereas those of all otherRussianbanksgrewby29percent.Sincetheoutbreakoftheglobalfinancialcrisisin 2008, the market position of public banks has been strengthened thanks to liquidity support and equity contributions by the government. The 2008 crisis also pushed some of the weaker private banks to accept state control. The share of assets of state-controlled banks 5 in the country's total exceeded one-half in 2008, and reached 55.8 percent by the beginning of 2012 (Fig. 1) .
6 As shown in Figure 1 , the increase in market share was neither uniform, nor continuous, with a slight decrease occurring in 2010 before a resumption in growth in 2011.
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Direct Versus Indirect Government Ownership and Control
By 2011, the share of banks controlled indirectly by the state (the category "banks controlled by state-owned companies and banks" in Fig. 2 ) had grown to one-fourth of the total for the public sector. Some banks (Rossiyskiy Bank Razvitiya, currently MSB Bank, and Roseximbank) were transferred from direct federal ownership to Vneshekonombank. After 2008 the government assigned the task of taking over failed private banks to "state corporations" (ASV and Vneshekonombank) and state-owned enterprises, and funded the rescue operations.
financialinstitution,wasreplacedbyindirectownershipoffederalauthoritiesviaentitiesof the VTB group.
Indirect state ownership of banks tends to be in the form of proprietary structures having several intermediate layers of corporate control and a large state-owned enterprise or bank at the top (i.e., via corporate pyramids). There may be several reasons why the government astheownerofabankwouldfindapyramidtobeanattractiveoption.Suchachoicemay stemfromtheinabilitytoefficientlymanageandcontrolalargenumberofbanksbytraditionalbureaucraticmethodsofstategovernance.Othermotivations,relativelybenignone, reflectthedesiretoovercomefinancingandpropertyrightsconstraintsaswellastoincrease efficiencyviamoreflexibledecentralizeddecisionmaking.Indirectpublicownershipprovides a higher degree of immunity from government interference and preferential access to publicfunds (Fanetal.,2005; Okhmatovskiy,2009 ).Indirectlyownedbankscanbetterpursueprofit-orientedpolicies;in2001-2003theaveragereturnonassetsatbankswithtiesto state-owned enterprises was higher than that for banks directly controlled by the government (Okhmatovskiy,2009) A pyramidal structure, however, separates ownership from control, and each additional tier weakens public scrutiny over the use of funds. Indirect state ownership is preferred by bank insiders because it reduces their accountability and makes it possible to manage those banks likequasi-privateproperty,whichoftenleadstodilutionofmajoritystakes,tacit appropriation of bank equity, related lending, self-trading, and other forms of opportunism. Moscow's city government fully controlled Bank Moskvy at its inception in 1995, but the government's direct control gradually was reduced after a sequence of outwardly innocent corporate actions, leaving the city holding only 48 percent of its equity. In 2011 it became known that the previous 
State-Controlled Banks Compared with Other Market Participants
In the sample state-controlled banks tend to be much larger than the other Russian banks. The mean assets held by the 6 core state-controlled banks at the end of 2011 (3.2 trillion rubles) and 25 other state-controlled banks (154 billion rubles) dwarfed those of all other Russian banks (34 billion rubles, as shown in Table 2 ). However, the share of loans in total assetsisslightlybelowaverage,indicatingthesignificanceoftheirnon-lendingactivities.It is also noteworthy that state-controlled banks tend to rely less on household deposits to fund their operations than other Russian banks.
Although argument have been made that the form of ownership is irrelevant for performance and that the truly important factors are the quality of corporate governance, management, and the legal system, empirical studies in which the form of ownership is an explanatory variablehavefoundthatthemarketbehaviorandfinancialperformanceofstate-controlled banks do differ from those of private and foreign-controlled banks. Whereas lending and pricing decisions of state-owned banks can deviate from rational economic practice, lending on behalf of the government need not imply inferior revenue performance of public banks incomparisonwiththeirprivatepeers.InRussia,domesticpublicbanksarenolessefficient thantheprivate(Karasetal.,2010).Althoughthatfindingwasmetwithsomeskepticism,it waslaterverifiedbythefinancialdetailsdisclosedinbankingstatistics.By2010theprofit-abilityofstate-controlledbanks(usingtheCBR'sdefinition)washigherthanthatofallother groups of domestic banks, as shown in Table 3 , based on CBR (2011, pp. 22-23) .
State-controlledbanksalsotendtoperformbetteronatleastonemeasureofefficiency. IcalculatedaratioofcoststooperationalprofitsforRussia'stop30banksin2011,using data from the Central Bank's website (http://www.cbr.ru) and the respective banks' data. The result for state-controlled banks was better than for foreign-controlled banks and for domestic private institutions (46.5, 62.8, and 73.8 percent, respectively) .
Evidenceofhigherprofitabilityandefficiencyofstate-controlledbanksinRussiaruns counter to the conventional wisdom, which maintains that it should be the lowest among allparticipants(e.g.,LaPortaetal.,2002).Italsocontradictsthefindingsoftheprevailing empirical literature on European economies in transition (Bonin et al., 2005; Fries et al., 2006) . The interpretation of this phenomenon is, to say the least, a challenging task. It might beassumedthatasubstantialshareofprofitsearnedbystate-controlledbanksmayinessence represent rent extracted from an oligopoly position, such advantages as the handling of public procurement, the general backing of the state, and from administratively imposed preferences.Pricingpoliciesofstate-controlledbanksmightreflectspecificlendingpracticesand procedures, which particularly might facilitate an understanding of the phenomenon. Adifferentexplanationforthehigherprofitabilityofpublic-sectorbankspointstothe factthatthefinancialdatawhichtheyreportarelessreliablethanthosedisclosedbyprivate andforeign-ownedbanks.Forexample,until2011BankMoskvy'sfinancialstatementsdid not reveal the magnitude of lending to related companies, thus enabling the bank to report substantial"profits"andconcealanimmensegaponitsbalancesheet.Oddly,thiswasnot detected (or in any event was overlooked) by external auditors, casting serious doubt on the qualityoffinancialreportingbyotherlargestate-ownedbanks.
Inanyevent,profitabilityisapoorindicatorofrelativeperformanceinaneconomywith a blurred boundary between commercial banking and development banking and absence of a level playing field for all financial entities. If players with the largest market shares are basically non-market entities that by definition cannot go bankrupt (thanks to soft budget constraints), standard models of industrial organization may not be particularly relevant in explaining the behavior of Russian banks.
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE: CONVERGENCE WITH CEE OR WITH CHINA? Tiers and Macro-level Design
The Russian banking system formally consists of two tiers (the Central Bank and all commercial banks), but as a matter of fact it has evolved into a three-tier system. The intermediate layer is represented by the core state-controlled banks-i.e., Sberbank, the VTB-group banks (VTB, VTB24, VTB-Severo-Zapad, and since 2011 also Bank Moskvy and Transkreditbank), and Rosselkhozbank. Gazprombank could also be added, although government control over it is indirect and less transparent. Core state-controlled banks are the first ones to receive state assistance during periods of stress. They act as agents of the monetary authorities in supplying credit, channeling liquidity into the system, bailing out weaker institutions, setting a politically desirable price level for loans and deposits, and supporting the money exchange and even the stock market. The structure of the Russian banking industry is presented in greater detail in Table 4 . The leading position of the three federal-level "national champions" (Sberbank, VTB, and Rosselkhozbank) has become increasingly consolidated over time through organic growth as well as mergers and acquisitions, especially by VTB, which recently took over Bank Moskvy and Transkreditbank. Figure 3 shows the corresponding erosion of market share and crowding out of the domestic private sector.
The government is the source of two-thirds of all investment in industry and infrastructure, and most of that investment is channeled through state-controlled banks. Russia also has adevelopmentbankbut,unlikeChina,doesnothaveofficiallyrecognized"policybanks."
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Social demand for policy lending is partly met by large state-controlled banks that are engaged in supplying long-term financing to "systemically important" enterprises and "strategic 9 Russia's Vneshekonombank, the development bank, has a sizeable portfolio of corporate loans that might equal 2 percent of the total loans granted by commercial banks (Vneshekonombank, 2011) . In China, apart from the China Development Bank, there are also two "policy banks"-the Export-Import Bank of China and the Agricultural Development Bank of China (CBRC, 2011, p. 150). projects,"includingsportsandconventionfacilities,orinprovidingemergencyrelieffunds to companies and regions impacted by natural or technological disasters. As a result, the public banks have built a portfolio of policy-based assets (loans, equities, and industrial assets) that are unusual for commercial banks. VTB and Sberbank now are spearheading Russia's Raiffeisenbank (2006 Raiffeisenbank ( , 2011 outward economic expansion into Europe and Asia, which pursues mainly geopolitical goals andforwhichthereisoftenlittlebusinessjustification(suchasacquisitionofaGermanautomaker or a failing Austrian bank).
ThegrowingnumericalindicatorsoffinancialdepthandbankoutreachinCEE (IMF, 2010; World Bank, 2010; Raiffeisenbank, 2011, pp. 14-18, 60-61 ) may suggest to some observers that Russian banking system is gradually converging with the rest of emerging Europe. However, institutionally and structurally the gap remains wide. Most of post-communist countries in Europe have curtailed the government's presence in the banking industry to below 20 percent and opened it up to international competition, whereas these trends are moving in the opposite direction in Russia (Fig. 4) .
Onmostcounts,agrowingsimilarityisevidentbetweenthebankingmodelsofRussia and China, rather than between Russia and the CEE countries. The sheer size of the public sector in banking puts Russia in the same league with India (around 75 percent) and China (over 90 percent). Industrial policy consists of growing "national champions" in the public sector, modernizing them to the extent possible, and supporting their expansion in both domestic and international markets. While the public sector is the driving force, domestic private capital plays a complementary role, even though it is gradually being marginalized despite its impressive growth (policy lending and directed lending guided by the government are growing at faster rates than regular commercial lending). Foreign direct investment (FDI) into Russian banks remains limited (ca. 18 percent of total assets) and cannot reshape the industry the way it has done in CEE.
To date the similarities between China and Russia have not been recognized due to political sensitivities in Russia. Russian analysts perceive the Chinese banking system to be functional and successful, 10 whereas the Russian one is not. Consideration of selected technical parameters and political rhetoric has tempted some authors to conclude that Russian banking is evolving in a different direction from China (Speranskaya, 2009). Divergent measures of financialdepthinChinaandRussia,however,canoriginatefrombroaderstructuralandinstitutional characteristics such as China's high savings rate, which fuels local banks with cheap liquidity. Causality can go in either direction though, and it is the stability and trustworthiness of core state-owned banks that enhances the propensity to save in China. Conversely, low savingsrates,ahighshareofcashinbroadmoneyaggregate,financialshallowness,andmistrust of banks in general might be a product of two-and-one-half decades of ill-conceived reforms of the banking/saving system in Russia.
Market Structure
If measured in a traditional way, concentration in the Russian banking industry is not particularly high by European emerging market standards (Raiffeisenbank, 2011, p.10) . The CBR(2011,p.14)reportedthatbytheendof2010averagevaluesoftheHHI(HerfindahlHirschman Index) 11 stoodjustunder0.1fortotalassetsandtotalequity,0.125forloansto non-financialcompanies,and0.236forhouseholddeposits-i.e.,atrelativelylowlevels.
10 For succinct reviews of the regulatory framework and reforms in China's banking sector, see Liu and Wu (2008) and He and Fu (2008) . Broader and more recent perspectives on China's related economic policies can inter alia be foundinKeidel(2011), Kroeber(2011 ),andNaughton(2011 . Onemustkeepinmind,however,thatintermsofsizeofassets,6ofthetop10banksare state-controlled institutions (Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Rosselkhozbank, Bank Moskvy and VTB24), 3 are foreign controlled (UniCredit Bank, Rosbank, and Raiffeisenbank), and only 1 (Alfa Bank) is owned by domestic private capital, as shown in Table 5 .
Banks controlled by the state might be viewed as ultimately related parties if we add up the market shares of the main state-controlled banks (Sberbank, VTB Group, and Rosselkhozbank) to check the effect it would produce on concentration. If we measure concentration as themarketshareofthetopfivebankinginstitutionsonastand-alone(unconsolidated)basis and then on a consolidated basis, 12 we obtain a difference of a few percentage points. This difference, albeit small, is enough to push the combined market share of state-controlled banks over the controlling level of 50 percent, as shown in Figure 5 .
Let us now turn to an analysis of market concentration by calculating the HHI for various segments of the banking market for the two most recent years, namely 2010 and 2011.
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Onanunconsolidatedbasis,allmarketsegmentsexcepthouseholddepositsappeardispersed 12 Consolidation means that the market shares of the core state-controlled banks (Sberbank, VTB Group, and Rosselkhozbank) are summed. 13 The sample is very representative, as it covers 94.3 percent of all bank assets in Russia, 78.1 percent of loans to non-financialcompanies,95.2percentofloanstophysicalpersons,and96.5percentofallhouseholddeposits. Author'scalculationsbasedondatainCBR,2012andRBK,2012 (HHI values below 0.15). When we consolidate the market shares of the main state-controlled banks, the markets begin to appear moderately concentrated, and the household deposit market and the corporate loans segment both cross the threshold of high concentration (HHI = 0.25), as shown in Figure 6 . The level of concentration would even be higher after we add the market shares of other public banks (Gazprombank, Ak Bars, Svyaz-Bank, Globex, etc.). Therecentgrowthinconcentrationmightbeoneoftheeffectsoftheglobalfinancialcrisis and the post-crisis consolidation that reduced competition by strengthening mainly the large state-controlled banks (see IMF, 2011, p. 5) . State-controlled banks in Russia are now active in nearly all of the country's market segments with few exceptions. According to the CBR, by the beginning of 2011 state-owned banks held 57.4 percent of all household deposits, 40.1 percent of corporate deposits, 49.3 percent of all loans, 46.4 percent of household loans, and 50.6 percent of the banks' securities portfolios (CBR, 2011, pp. 17-21) .
14 This dominant position allows state-controlled banks to become price-setters in the different segments of the broad market. Anzoátegui et al. (2012) have studied competition in the Russian banking sector using non-structural methods (unrelated to indicators of market concentration and structure) and found that Russia's top 20 banks, and state-owned banks more generally, seem to be able to exert greater market power than the smaller banks and privately owned institutions. The study suggests that they could thus charge prices well in excess of their marginal costs.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Since 1988 state involvement in Russia's banking industry has followed a cycle of disengagement and re-engagement. After many decades of a state monopoly in banking, massive 14 I think that this estimate is on the low side. and spontaneous state withdrawal occurred. There was no organized privatization of banks in Russia, unlike in CEE countries, so top managers and other insiders were able to quietly appropriate the assets and physical infrastructure of hundreds of local divisions and branches of spetsbanki(specializedstate-ownedbankscoveringeachbroadfieldofactivity).Agradual but continuous re-engagement of government with the banking industry began only after the 1998financialcrisis,andreceivedadditionalimpetusduringthenextcrisisin2008-2009.By 2010 the number of banks under state control exceeded the number that the government could runefficiently,andtheirfieldsofactivityandoperationsofbranchnetworksbegantooverlap. Consequently a new phase of disengagement ensued, with the government withdrawing from some of the second-and third-tier banks it had come to control directly or indirectly. State divestment was handled in the usual opaque way, allowing insiders and operators with politicalconnectionstobenefitfromtheprocess.
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15 A fairly typical example of a rigged "privatization" scheme is the management buy-out of Russian Commercial Bank, a VTB subsidiary in Cyprus, for a price below the intermediate dividend for the second half of 2009, which new shareholders received shortly after the transaction (Vedomosti, November 13, 2009). Another case is Sobinbank, whoserescuewas financedbypublicfundsandexecutedbyGazenergoprombank,amemberoftheGazpromgroup. In 2010 both banks were "privatized" for an undisclosed amount, having been turned over to a politically well connected operator, Bank Rossiya of St. Petersburg (Kommersant, December 3, 2009 and June 18, 2010) . A similar case is that of Bank Petrovsky, which after an expensive bailout by the deposit insurance agency (ASV) was sold at an unknownpricetoaprivatefinancialgroup,FKOtkrytie(ASV,n.d.).Anothercase involvesthegovernmentofthe Khanty-Mansiyskregion,whichsolditscontrollingshareofBankKhanty-MansiyskiytotheprivateNomos-Bank, and with that its control of a subsidiary called Novosibirskiy Munitsipal'nyy Bank. The terms were not disclosed (Vedomosti, December 17, 2010). In March 2012, the pressure on the state to divest led Russia's then-president Dmitriy Medvedev to instruct financial authorities to prepare for a reduction of the government's share in core banks to a level below 50 percent (Vedomosti,March23,2012) .Thissignificant initiativemyreflectoneoftwopossiblescenarios.First,theauthoritiesaresincereintheir intentions (Scenario A). In this case, Sberbank, VTB, Rosselkhozbank, and Gazprombank will have to rediscover themselves as privately held, market-based institutions. Conversely, (under Scenario B), the authorities do not intend to relinquish control over the core national lenders, and the president's instruction was merely a public gesture by an outgoing politician.
16 The announced withdrawal is disingenuous and the government will continue steering the decisions of core banks through corporate governance instruments and by allowing formallyunaffiliatedbusinessgroupstobecomenewshareholdersofrecord.
Scenario A is unlikely because it implies self-destruction of the pillars of the country's nationalfinancialsystemthatservedRussiawellduringthelastfinancialcrisis 17 and have implemented the government's industrial and social policies. A genuine state withdrawal from the largest banks would worsen their financial standing due to the inevitable loss of quasi-sovereign ratings at an investment-grade level; these ratings now enable banks to raise funding relatively inexpensively. Whether banks will become more efficient after government withdrawal is an open question. During the previous round of state disengagement, the pilfering of the spetsbankibyinsidersdidnotproducegainsinefficiency (Schoors,2003) , and most of the offspring of the spetsbanki are now defunct due to mismanagement, incompetence, fraud, and asset stripping.
Under Scenario B the same risks exist, but to a lesser extent. From the viewpoint of the public interest, it will be a lose-lose situation: the authorities will continue to bear all of the liabilitieswithoutbeingabletoenjoytheadvantagesensuingfromdirectcontroloverlenders. That contributes to diminished transparency and greater scope of the agency problem and managerial opportunism.
Not every type of ownership change in a state-controlled bank can be considered "privatization." Market placement of a minority stake in Sberbank or VTB, for example, does not affect control. The identities of the substantial minority shareholders also matter, because there is a tendency to bring in related parties or other public-sector institutions, including foreign ones, such as sovereign funds from China or the Gulf states of the Middle East (Gazeta. ru, June 24, 2011).
MoreorlessinlinewithChineseexperience,RussiacouldtrytoaccommodateanIPO of a large state-owned bank within the existing institutional and political arrangement by adopting and mastering the mechanisms of corporate governance (boards of directors, nonexecutive directors, committees, external audits, etc.). A reduction of equity participation below 50 percent would not automatically lift the government's grip on bank management andthemainfinancialflows.LaPortaetal.(2002),forexample,consideredabanktobe "government-owned" if the state holds at least 20 percent of equity but acts as the single largestshareholder.OECD(2005)hassuggestedthatsignificantstatecontrolstartsatthelevelof 10 percent of voting rights in the company.
If the Russian banking system is converging with that of China and not with the CEE countries, then policies should aim to eliminate inconsistencies in the model. Russia needs to rediscoverhowtoreappotentialbenefitsofacentralizedsystem,suchashighsavingrates, high relevance of banks for the real sector of the economy, strong resilience to exogenous shocks,lowvolatilityofbankearnings,anddirecteffectivecontrolovermanagers.Otherwise itmayonlybearthecostsofsuchasystem,namelyovercapacity,inefficiency,over-lending to state-owned enterprises and local authorities, low quality of assets, poor controls, lack of transparency, rampant fraud and managerial opportunism, and regular costly bailouts of public banks. 18 In particular, Russian authorities should reconsider their tolerance for multilayered corporate pyramids in the banking sector and consolidate their equity stakes into a government bank holding. Corporate pyramids also exist in China, but they have fewer layers between the government and the entity at the end of the chain; in Russia there may be up tofiveintermediatelayersthatdilutecontrol.Someconsolidationwithinthepublicsector already is evident, as the two "national champions" (Sberbank and VBT) take over smaller banks.Thegovernmentmightstartprofilingtheactivityofitsbanksmorestrictly,thusmaking another step toward the Chinese system, which resembles the system of spetsbanki in the former Soviet Union.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The purpose of this paper was to provide additional insights into the political economy of banking in Russia, with a focus on state control. It has offered an alternative estimate of the size of the public sector by encompassing banks directly controlled by public organizations as well as those that are controlled indirectly by other entities. The method outlined here makes it possible to increase the number of public-sector banks in the sample from 16 to 38, with their combined market share rising to almost 56 percent of the total assets in the banking system by the start of 2011.The fact that these institutions now dominate a number of segments of the banking market has important implications for an assessment of empirical calculations ofbankefficiencyandcompetitiveness.
A recent development is the gradual replacement of direct public ownership by indirect ownership (and control) through the mechanism of state-owned companies and state corporations. At present roughly 25 percent of public-sector banking is situated beyond direct state control. Such indirectly controlled banks are in the advantageous position of being able to access public funds without (for the most part) the responsibility for performing socially important functions on behalf of the government. Although this confers certain advantages in termsofflexibilityandefficiency,indirectpublicownershipexacerbatestheagencyproblem in the public sector. Furthermore, the emergence of corporate pyramids in the public sector may be a sign that insiders have entrenched themselves vis-à-vis both external investors and the state per se. Banks within these structures are thus at risk due to the opportunism of top managers as well as other "insiders."
Contrary to predictions in some theoretical literature on economic transition and to the findings of empirical studies of banking in CEE, Russian state-controlled banks display higher,notlower,profitabilityandefficiencythanotherparticipants.Thekeytothisphenomenon may lie in the competitive position of these banks and in the nature of operations they carry out on behalf of the government (policy-lending, acquisition of industrial assets and their subsequent disposal, etc.). Some of the earnings of these banks represent, in essence, rentratherthanmarket-earnedprofit.Thus,reportednumbersforprofitandallderivatives thereof(ROA,ROE,Z-score,etc.)mayconstituteimpropermeasurestouseformodeling bank behavior in an economy with a blurred boundary between commercial and development bankingandthelackofalevelplayingfieldforthevariousfinancialagents.
My paper also suggests an alternative way of looking at market concentration in Russia by consolidating market shares of core state-controlled banks instead of considering them onastand-alonebasis.Thismodificationproducesapictureofamoreconcentratedbankingmarketthanhasbeenofficiallyclaimed,particularlyforhouseholddepositsandloansto physical persons.
Finally, I argue that with respect to its banking system Russia is more comparable to China than to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, because typologically and institutionally the Russian and the Chinese systems tend to be similar. The direction of the Russian system's further evolution, therefore, might not involve convergence with Europe. To put it succinctly, the dominance of state-controlled banks in Russia may persist for quite a long time. Public banks are indispensable as long as the economy remains under control of a state bureaucracywhoseleadershavechildreninterestedinsecuringprestigious,well-paidjobs. Even the popular news magazine The Economist now recognizes that government banking in emerging markets might have some advantages, rather than solely drawbacks (Mutually, 2010, pp. 10-12) . In this context, the recent initiatives of the Russian authorities to withdraw fromcorebanksseemmisplaced,forsuchmeasureswouldbenefittheinsidersofthosebanks andtheircompetitors,butotherwiseservetoinflictdamage.Itwouldinsteadmakesensefor the government to consolidate its direct and indirect stakes in banks into a transparently organized and better-managed bank holding.
